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Introduction
Human rights are a pressing issue for global society at the start of the 
twenty-first century.  Gaining increasing popularity since the foun-
dation of the United Nations (1945; hereafter UN), “rights” – human 
rights – have gained increasing appeal not only to state actors, but 
NGOs, social activists, the media, academics and “everyday” mem-
bers of global society as well.  1989 was a watershed year.  While 
rights concepts were marginalized under the Cold War, the victory 
of liberal capitalism opened the door for raised expectations con-
cerning global adherence to rights standards.  Samuel Huntington 
(1996, 193) argues that “the transition and collapse of the Soviet Un-
ion [and satellite states] generated…the belief that a global demo-
cratic revolution was underway and that in short order Western con-
cepts of human rights and…forms of political democracy would 
prevail throughout the world.”  Huntington is correct.  While Marx-
ist political-economy contributed to the history of human rights via 
welfare and social rights, human rights’ intellectual roots lay in lib-
eral-democratic traditions dating to the eighteenth century.
Growing literatures (e.g., Slaughter 2007; Madison 2011; Borra-
dori 2012) acknowledge human rights as greater than political phi-
losophy.  Rights address conceptions of the self – modern, “cen-
tered” concepts of subjectivity (see Slaughter 1994, 411) – ideas of 
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political utopia (Moyn 2010) and narrative structures binding hu-
man origins with human ends (Dorfman 2012).  The contemporary 
social subject is constantly confronted with images and ideas de-
noting rights.  We are also confronted with the the articulation of 
rights on all levels of the social power scale – “hi” to “low.”  Given 
this, there is a need for an analysis of the rights “environment” at 
the start of the twenty-first century.  I.e., how, precisely, are we con-
fronted with rights ideas and images such that they appear “natu-
ral” – universal, “human” and ineluctably a part of the “age” (Bob-
bio 1996) in which we find ourselves?
At least a partial answer to this might be the concept of a human 
rights “life-world.”  “Life-world” (Lebenswelt) is borrowed from 
phenomenological philosophy – specifically from Edmund Husserl 
(1983; 1970).  The life-world involves everything “taken for granted” 
in human life (Husserl 1970, 123); the life-world encompasses sets of 
presumptions built-up over historical time.  Life-worlds never ap-
pear as presumptions, or “life-world,” however.  This is an important 
point.  Life-world appears as what is “simply there” (einfach da) 
(Husserl 1983, 51).  Life-world appears as things registering as “lit-
eral” (wörtlich) as well as “figurative” (bildlich).  I.e., representing 
concepts such as human rights, or providing senses that rights are 
simply “there,” involves ensconcing social subjects in rights’ literal 
and figurative representation.  This is how rights confront us.  In the 
twenty-first century, rights pertain to the “real.”  Rights pertain to 
the empirical.  Rights pertain to “true” historical events – the terrain 
of the “literal.”  However, rights also pertain to entertainment, “vir-
tuality,” commercialism, advertisement and fantasy simulation – 
movies, video games and fashion.  This will be posed as rights “figu-
ration” – a semi-fictionalization, or “fantasticalization,” of rights. 
Thinking about literality and figuration in a spectrum, what emerg-
es is a liminal effect.  Engaging social spaces of fact or fiction, enter-
tainment or “serious” politics, rights “appear” for us.  We can’t 
“avoid” rights, as Kenneth Cmiel (2004, 117) argues.  Popular and 
commercial cultures of rights confront us, as do serious political cul-
tures of rights.  In terms of two essential modes of representation – 
“literality” and “figuration” – rights become an ineludible concept 
within the confines of contemporary political society and ideas.
In terms of a rights life-world, however, fact and fiction is not 
the end of the story.  Rights representation demands reference to 
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history.  I.e., rights confront us as a matter of not only how they look 
(are they “entertainment” or “fact”?), but who, socially, speaks 
rights.  Who on the global stage invokes rights ideas?  Who claims 
human rights as important?  What are the social positions from 
which rights are either articulated or advocated?  A full understand-
ing of a rights life-world involves not only understanding represen-
tations of rights – i.e., problematizing if rights are represented 
“factually” or “fictionally” – but historiographical arguments con-
textualizing rights in the political evolution of the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries.  The point here is to blend phenomenology 
and historiography to create images of broad-scale tactile and socio-
historical spaces in which rights confront us.  These are, it will be 
argued, left-right axes of fact and fiction and up-down axes of social 
advantage and disadvantage – i.e., rights as spoken from the social 
“centers” and “margins,” as sociological vocabularies would have 
it1.  The point here, albeit in broad strokes, is to outline how rights 
are on either “side” of us in terms of modes of historical and social 
representation, as well as “above” and “below” us in terms of who 
speaks rights, or the locales of ideological articulation brought by 
degrees of social privilege, or the lack thereof.
The first part of this paper will engage rights “factuality” and 
“fictionality,” or “literality” and “figuration.”  The second part of 
the paper will engage the historiography of rights from the mid- 
to late twentieth century in the context of the evolution of global 
politics.
Rights on “Either Side of Us”:  Modes of Rights 
Representation
We invoke Husserl’s notion of “literal” and “figurative” representa-
tion because of the role of literality and figuration, or reality and 
“phantasy,” as Husserl (1983, 101) phrased it, in world-constitution. 
The point for Husserl – as well as ranges of his followers (e.g., Gad-
amer 1998; Schütz 1967) – was that the world always presents itself 
as a whole.  The life-world, one’s “surrounding world” (Husserl 
1983, 51), is simply “where I find myself.”   This is in all the ways in 
1 At work here is blend of Wallersteinian world-system theory and Pierre 
Bourdieu’s notion of social capital – i.e., that social power ultimately involves 
economic accumulation, yet prestige may be an equally important factor in 
that process to material accumulation and monetary wealth.  See Wallerstein 
(1974); Bourdieu (1984).
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which the world presents itself, or the modalities through which 
one perceives the world.  Here, one is disallowed the ability to sep-
arate out fact and fiction.  Though one might fantasize – have 
dreams, make “false” or “pretend” representations of a thing, or 
create “fictions” (Fiktionen) of a particular concept (Husserl 1983, 
101) – ”fictions” are nonetheless real.  Fictions “hover before one.” 
Fictions reflect the modes via which concepts confront us.  One 
might imagine the historical past or present.  However, one’s im-
aginations, or understandings, of the world by which one is con-
fronted involve particular interplays between senses of what is 
“real” and what is “not.”  Fact and fiction, history and imagination, 
true and fabricated – at least under the Husserlian rubric – function 
on a continuum.  The continuum of fact and fiction – what I am call-
ing the “left-right axis” of fact and fiction, or rights on “either side 
of us,” provides the swath of modalities via which one relates to 
particular concepts.  This includes ephemeral (and political) con-
cepts such as human rights.
Discussing rights in this way is complex.  This is due to confusion 
over what human rights are.  Are rights philosophical expressions 
about the nature of the individual – that he or she (the individual) is 
born into “reason and conscience,” as the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR; United Nations 1948) puts it, or are rights a 
specific set of protections and obligations accorded to groups and 
individuals (such as the right to recognition as a person before the 
law, as the UDHR also states, or the right to a standard of living “ad-
equate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family” 
[United Nations 1948])?  Answers are nebulous.  Some see rights as 
a transcendental assertion about the universality of human individ-
uality (e.g., Morsink 2009).  Others see rights as a matter of concrete 
legal implementation, and politico-administrative orders through 
which law is enacted (see Weissbrodt and de la Vega 2007).  We 
maintain neither of these understandings of human rights.  Rights 
represent vague, general references to notions of human freedom, 
individuality, social justice, liberation, resistance to oppression, eco-
nomic development and idealistic views of international relations. 
Human rights are a discourse – a term or phrase one uses.  Rights 
discourse nonetheless reflects general, or perhaps vague, awareness 
that rights regimes (institutions, laws, etc…) exist.  The point of de-
parture for this paper is nonetheless that, for most members of the 
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social body, rights are conceived of in Gestalt form.  Rights are sim-
ply thought of as “there,” intuitively maintained and that, in a gen-
eral sense, we can all be sure that the ethics and morality to which 
rights representations refer could be universally maintained.
One might identify two kinds of rights representations:  repre-
sentations comprehended, or classifiable, as involving “truthful,” 
“concrete” or “historically accurate” references to rights events, or 
at least truthful representations of rights situations (conflicts, social 
turmoil, legal institutions, environmental disaster, etc…), and rep-
resentations of rights or, again, at least rights “situations,” blending 
fictional elements with varying degrees of “truth.”.  While space 
limits our full exploration of the idea, this in some ways reflects 
the notion of historical fiction as developed by Georgy Lukács 
(1962) – i.e., that the use of “real” events helps accentuate the do-
ings of fictional characters by according them levels recogniza-
bility (grounding them in areal a social real world).  This is where-
as the dramatization of “real” events via fictional characterization 
underscores the importance and gravity of “true” historical events 
by disembodying them from their native contexts, thus highlight-
ing them in bas relief.  Representations of human rights occur with 
varying levels of fictionalization.  Some, e.g., the 2005 film The In-
terpreter, manufacture entire civil conflicts with recognizable yet 
nonetheless fully fabricated plot lines.  The civil strife referred to in 
a film like The Interpreter draws from ranges of post-colonial, sub-
Saharan African social conflicts (e.g., the Congo, Zimbabwe and 
Uganda).  Human rights – events such as genocide and political 
oppression – are “represented” in the form of discussion of an Afri-
can state which does not exist (“Matobo”).  However, representa-
tion also refers “reality” – something “literal.”  This is the general 
phenomenon of civil strife in sub-Saharan Africa, problems of de-
colonization and issues of democracy and recognition in countries 
recognizable from the African map, yes, but also the role of interna-
tional institutions such as the UN such conflicts (the UN being the 
seat of much of the film’s action).  Blending these real and fictional 
elements, The Interpreter is historical fiction par excellence.
Especially in a short paper, it’s impossible to refer to all the exam-
ples of rights representations invoking varieties of literal and figu-
rative, or “factual” and “fictional,” rights representation as they’re 
posed here.  It’s moreover difficult to point to the number of repre-
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sentations with which members of global society are confronted, or 
the multiple media channels through which rights representation 
takes place.  Intertextuality also plays a role.   By way of example, 
one may read, in novel form, John LeCarré’s The Constant Gardner, 
dealing with African health, development and the role of private 
companies in such rights issues (though in a fictional, spy novel 
context).  After reading the novel, however, one might then see the 
film and watch previews or trailers for the film on the Internet.  Re-
gardless of intertextuality, however, we may refer to the multiple 
varieties of representation involving blends of fact and fiction, and 
the blending of rights “fantasy” with rights “reality.”  The following 
are but examples:
•	 MTV produces an online videogame entitled Darfur is Dying. 
This is based on the 2003-11 Darfur Crisis in which hundreds of 
thousands were killed and displaced due to civil war in Sudan’s 
Darfur region.  In addition to executions, displacement and ad hoc 
killings, human rights violations in this conflict included famine, 
ethnic discrimination and religious conflict.  In MTV’s game, one 
adopts a character attempting to survive in a refugee camp. 
One’s “life” is measured in access to water, the “threat” level one 
is under, food supply, the general health of the camp and number 
of days in the camp (measured in cartoon bars and statistics).  Ob-
viously, the game involves the adoption of fictional characters 
and cartoonish depictions of “general” events involved in the cri-
sis (attacks by the Janjaweed militia, foraging for water, dealing 
with contaminated water, etc…).
•	 Benetton clothing long ran series of controversial advertisements 
based on pleas for social reconciliation and justice, yet promoting 
its clothing brand.  Most controversial was the “We, on Death 
Row” campaign (2001).  Here, as a matter of protest against the 
death penalty – a controversial point under international human 
rights law (disallowed, e.g., under the European Convention 
on Human Rights [European Council 2010]; provided for but 
frowned upon in the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights  [United Nations 1966]) – Benetton provided human-
izing portraits of twenty-six death row killers in the United States, 
suggesting that their humanity demanded recognition as much 
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as anyone else’s under the UDHR’s assertion that “everyone has 
the right to life” (United Nations 1948).  This isn’t fiction.  How-
ever, it’s rights in the context of appeals to popular consumption 
and mass cultural commercialization.
•	 In addition to popular films such as The Interpreter – thematizing 
the UN and its relations with fictional civil strife in “Matobo” – 
films such as Blood Diamond (2006) and Hotel Rwanda (2004) 
achieved extensive box office and critical success based on vary-
ing levels of dramatization of civil conflicts in Sierra Leone and 
Rwanda.  This includes accurate, moment to moment accounts 
such as Hotel Rwanda – yet nonetheless featuring Hollywood 
stars and dramatic background music – as well as accounts fea-
turing fully fictional characters such as those central to Blood Dia-
mond (a fictional mercenary and Mende fisherman, played by 
Leonardo di Caprio and Djimon Hounsou).
•	 Apple Computers marketed its brand in the late 1990s via a cam-
paign based on free speech imagery – the “Think Different” cam-
paign.  Here, rights “heroes” such as Martin Luther King and 
Gandhi were portrayed with the Apple logo.  This suggested 
that either Apple computers embodied the free spirit of rights 
activists such as King and Gandhi, or that figures such as King 
and Gandhi might have approved of the intellectual non-con-
formity supposedly promoted by Apple’s brand (neither Gandhi 
nor King, of course, had anything to do with high technology, let 
alone Apple).
•	 The Kony 2012 film was an Internet sensation.  As of the compo-
sition of this article (August 2012), the video had been viewed 
over 92 million times on the video outlet YouTube.  Kony is, as 
are films like Blood Diamond or Hotel Rwanda – or, indeed, cam-
paigns like Benetton’s – a variety of rights “fact.”  Kony refers to 
a true conflict – the Lord’s Resistance Army’s (LRA) in the Con-
go and Uganda.  However, Kony “spices up” events, interspers-
ing the narrative of LRA and its war criminal leader with the 
personal ambitions of the video’s producer, and the entire crea-
tion’s presentation with extremely high production values and 
extensive special effects.
kvarter
a ademisk
academic quarter
Volume
A Human Rights Life-World?
Ben Dorfman
05 142
These are but a sample of rights’ fictional representation.  Readers 
might be able to generate dozens if not hundreds more examples of 
portrayals of human rights like those above.  Is Schindler’s List, e.g., 
a human rights film in its portrayal of the Holocaust?  Rendition, a 
successful 2007 film, also picked-up on rights issues depicting the 
extraordinary rendition of a fictional U.S. resident under new anti-
terrorism laws.  Videogame production company Serious Games 
produces “Global Conflicts,” dropping players into multiple fic-
tional situations and stories in developing global regions (e.g., Latin 
America).  The point is twofold.  First, in terms of broader pictures, 
one need not be reminded of the multiplicious “literal” rights rep-
resentations with which members of contemporary global society 
are continually confronted; CNN, BBC, national news outlets, ma-
jor dailies from The New York Times to Frankfurter Allgemeine and all 
manner of Internet news outlets and NGOs carry dozens, if not 
hundreds or thousands of stories on human rights on daily bases. 
These fit with descriptions of “true” historical information as rely-
ing on claims to “having been there” (Barthes 1989, 147) – either 
witnessing events, or the compilation of documentary evidence so 
irrefutable that the event in question must have taken place.  Un-
doubtedly, such events are “real”:  the truth of thousands dying in 
civil conflict, the denial of civil rights, unjust executions, irregular 
processes of law and denials of basic health care, housing and edu-
cation happen.  This doesn’t prevent “happening” from being a reg-
ister of experience, however – a mode of expression by which we 
recognize something as true, or “having been.”  “Reality” is a mode, 
or way, of being confronted by the world.
Rights imaginations – and certainly representations – extend be-
yond “factual” and “historically true” (“literal”) reporting, however. 
This is the second point.  Representations of rights delve into fantasy 
and the jouissance of marketing – things for which we “weren’t” 
there, or are taken out of context.  Human rights concern Leonardo 
di Caprio and Djimon Hounsou in Blood Diamond bonding across 
racial and class differences in the midst of a high speed chase 
through the mountains and jungles of Sierra Leone.  Human rights 
are part of the excitement of choosing a computer or clothing brand, 
as in the Apply and Benetton campaigns.  One can simulate the Dar-
fur crisis – and do so at any computer with an Internet connection. 
The conflict in Darfur is available in cartoon form. The imagery of 
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“serious” rights organizations from the UN to Amnesty Internation-
al to Human Rights Watch is interpolated with the adventure of 
films and novels and the thrill of “smart” consumerism.  We might 
note that this isn’t to human rights’ disadvantage. Via fiction and 
marketing, it becomes possible to reach broad audiences with rights 
messages.  This furthers the spread of rights ideas, and broadening 
beliefs in rights-based society.  Aesthetically, however, we gain an 
image of rights “messages” sitting on all “sides” of us.  To our left, 
we see attempts to tell rights “truths.”  These are the “literal” rights 
reporting of news agencies and serious rights organizations.  To the 
right, truth thins out.  Rights simultaneously maintain and lose their 
gravity.  Advertising and at least partially fictional films draw from 
general senses of the existence of rights events.  These are presented 
in “fantastic” form, however.  This includes production values and 
dramas in rights events which oriented at least as much towards 
entertainment and consumption as attempts to disseminate the 
“truth” of rights.  Collectively, “literal” and “figurative” rights rep-
resentations coalesce to form an atmosphere, or “world,” of rights. 
Looking at the world through any of its essential representational 
modes – fact or fiction – we see human rights.  These form a horizon, 
or set of expectations, for contemporary political beliefs and imagi-
nations.  This is that rights form our world – they are “happening” 
– yet that they are also our drama, or the stuff of our imaginations.
Rights Historiography and the “Age” of Rights
Here, readers should be encouraged to evoke their experiences and 
reflect on the multiple ways in which human rights messages enter 
everyday spaces.  Again, this is through “literal” rights reporting: 
factual information about rights events and issues.  Rights factuali-
ty slides into rights fiction, however – the dramatization of rights 
events, and their resetting, or reframing, into fictional and “fantas-
tic” contexts.  This includes the realms of rights as entertainment, 
and rights as a mode of popular, consumer-based advertising.
Such issues, however, beg historiographical questions.  Why 
this late twentieth, early twenty-first century preoccupation with 
rights?  To what mechanisms does the spectrum of rights “literality 
and figuration” respond?  If there is a socio-historical question con-
cerning the prevalence of rights ideas, does this provide us with 
further means of comprehending the multiplicious nature of the 
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locales from which we hear “rights,” or are confronted with hu-
man rights concepts as standards for social justice, freedom, per-
sonal liberation and the obligations of states to their populations, if 
not international society at-large?
Answers lie in rough understandings had about human rights 
history in the literature on human rights’ mid- and late-twentieth 
century evolution.  Human rights maintain deep historical roots. 
Paul Gordon Lauren (2011, 6) posits that any religious, ethical or 
philosophical system speaking to “the issue of human responsibil-
ity to others” contributes to the legacy of human rights.  Here, the 
start of human rights comes with the consideration of any level of 
legal justice or ethical human behavior – be it Platonic philosophy, 
Judeo-Christian ethics or primeval law codes, such as Hammura-
bi’s.  In the literature, it is also the case that human rights are some-
times linked to the evolution of international law.  Anthony Pagden 
(2003) suggests that natural rationalizations of international con-
quest in the early modern period (the age of European expansion) 
are the start of international perspectives on legality – that law 
might have a global reach.  Most usual (Hunt 2007; Hunt 1996; Is-
rael 2011) is to equate human rights with the democratic revolu-
tions of the late eighteenth century.  This is a powerful move.  Mod-
ern rights declarations such as the UDHR often take key wordings 
directly from such movements.  That we have “equal an inaliena-
ble rights,” as the UDHR phrases it, and that all human beings are 
“born free and equal in dignity and rights” (as the UDHR also 
phrases it), directly echoes claims that all men are “endowed by 
their Creator with certain unalienable rights” – an argument of the 
American Declaration of Independence (1776) – and that men are 
“born and remain free and equal in rights,” as the French Declara-
tion of the Rights of Man and Citizen phrases it (1789).  As Lynn 
Hunt (2007, 153) asserts, such documents give us the roots of hu-
man rights’ “abstract universality.”
Two points are salient.  Firstly, as Samuel Moyn (2010) points out, 
though claiming abstract universality, late eighteenth century and 
nineteenth century rights claims were generally nationalistic.  Eight-
eenth and nineteenth century rights claims concerned state forma-
tion.  Eighteenth and nineteenth century rights claims concerned the 
formation of citizenries.  These claims also concerned state sover-
eignty – the creation of distinctly governed national communities. 
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Herein, human rights become distinct from the “rights of man,” as 
Moyn (2010, 26) poses eighteenth and nineteenth century rights 
claims.  Human rights are intended to be just that – global visions of 
ethical, legal and welfare standards to which the international com-
munity should conform.  This is as opposed to rights formulated on 
behalf of the nation-state alone.
Moyn’s distinction gives way to complex views of human rights’ 
evolution in the second half of the twentieth century – largely from 
1945 to 1989.  In the wake of the Second World War, most Western 
powers, as well as emerging global regions such as Latin America, 
maintained vested interests in promoting rights.  Certainly, this con-
cerned reaction to the Holocaust – the demand that ethnically-based 
genocide should happen “never again” (Ishay 2004, 218).  However, 
the emergence of rights also connected to the publicized goals of the 
Allied powers and their justifications for war.  As advanced in docu-
ments such as the Atlantic Charter and Franklin Roosevelt’s famous 
“Four Freedoms” speech, the goals of the Allies largely concerned 
political freedom on individual, national as well as cultural scales 
(see Ishay 2004, 213).  Herein, though the precise politics concerning 
the introduction of human rights into the UN are complex (see Mor-
sink 1999; Waltz 2001; Waltz 2002; Normand and Zaidi 2008), it was 
very much at the insistence of marginalized peoples, represented by 
“small states” (such as those in Latin America), liberal elements 
within the American State Department and the activism of NGOs 
and global rights leaders such as Gandhi, Kwame Nkrumah, Elea-
nor Roosevelt and (at the time) Ho Chi Minh that human rights 
emerged as a central part of the new international order.  The cap-
stone to this was the publication of the UDHR in 1948.
1948 to 1989, or at least 1975, were nonetheless difficult years for 
human rights.  Cold War ideology was a major factor; political “uto-
pia,” as Moyn (2010) has phrased it, was posed in terms of either 
socialist collectivism or liberal, democratic-capitalist individualism. 
As Micheline R.  Ishay (2004) notes, both ideologies have a role in 
human rights.  This is via the notion of civil and political rights ver-
sus economic, social and cultural rights (i.e., rights defending the 
individual from the state as well as rights outlining the obligations 
of the state, or at least society, towards the individual).  Civil and 
political rights and economic, social and cultural rights form the 
touchstones of international human rights law (see Weissbrodt and 
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de la Vega 2007).  “Human rights” were nonetheless a rare vocabu-
lary to hear under the Cold War.  A variety of reasons account for 
this:  Soviet and American interventions in the Third World, sup-
pression of dissent within the United States and Soviet Union (be it 
in the form of ethnic minorities or free speech dissidents) and the 
general conduct of Realpolitik from South America to the Middle East 
to Sub-Saharan Africa.  I.e., both major Cold War powers were in-
volved ranges of both domestic and foreign human rights viola-
tions.  This led some, like American diplomat George Kennan, to 
assert human rights as an “unreal” foreign policy objective.  “We 
need not deceive ourselves that we can afford today the luxury of 
altruism and world-benefaction,” wrote Kennan in a 1948 State De-
partment document (in Ishay 2004, 227).  The point was hard-nosed 
approaches to containing the advance of world communism (from 
the capitalist perspective) or spreading socialist practice as an anti-
dote to capitalist exploitation (the socialist perspective).
This leads to two phenomena.  Firstly, advocates of human rights 
tended to come from the social margins as opposed to the halls of 
global political power.  The anti-Apartheid movement, American 
civil rights movement, dissident voices such as Andrei Sakharov 
other Soviet free speech dissidents, movements such as Amnesty 
– originally a prisoners of conscience movement – the women’s 
liberation movement and ethnic liberation movements were pri-
mary advocates of human rights (see Quataert 2009).  Human 
rights were not a “mainstream” discourse.  Rights, or human rights 
claims on a global scale, were counter-cultural.  They connected 
themselves to systemic critiques of American, Soviet, white, male 
and global power.
Second, until 1989, the rough exception in terms of acknowledg-
ing human rights came with the 1975 Helsinki Accords.  The Hel-
sinki Accords traded human rights monitoring in the Eastern Bloc 
for recognition of East German territorial sovereignty.  This deep-
ened the global institutionalization of human rights as ranges of hu-
man rights “watch” organizations (beginning with Helsinki Watch) 
sprung up throughout the Soviet Union and its satellite states.  In 
1989, these would coalesce into Human Rights Watch – along with 
Amnesty, one of the world’s two major human rights NGOs.  Still, as 
the Reagan administration reinvoked old-school Cold War policies 
and the Soviet Union alternated between liberalization and reaction-
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ary crackdowns, human rights were very much left in the sphere of 
NGOs and the socially marginalized (see Shestack 1989).  At the 
very least, rights’ invocation came as a matter of accusations and 
counter-accusations in forums such as the UN about the rectitude of 
the American versus the Soviet systems.
Noticeable in human rights historiography, at least as concerns 
the mid- to late-twentieth century, is how different the situation 
was surrounding human rights and their social articulation than it 
is today.  Obviously, as Huntington indicates, 1989-91 were water-
shed years.  Though having socialist outgrowths, human rights 
maintain intellectually liberal roots.  Liberalism’s post-1989 global 
victory was a boon for rights.  Increased global democratic practice 
brought increased rights expectations.  This was especially in rela-
tion to free speech and political representation.  Freedom of move-
ment, representation before the law, the right to property and the 
right to free expression, all enshrined in the UDHR, were now glob-
al expectations.  Rights were a transcendent vocabulary.  Rights en-
compassed and were brought within the new global atmosphere of 
political and economic liberalization.
Human rights nonetheless trumped liberalism in a particular 
way.  While liberalism’s victory in the Cold War provided for a sin-
gular ideology in the new global cultural economy – that of liberal 
capitalism – the general lack of alternative ideologies (the tradition-
al role of socialism) allowed for a forgetting of ideology itself.  Sla-
voj Žižek (1989, 153) argues that ideology is about “splits” – ideas in 
opposition.  He may be correct.  Without an ideological threat – en-
croaching communism or, alternatively, capitalist imperialism – it 
becomes possible to point towards base concepts which are sup-
posed to transcend ideology.  Herein, hegemonic ideologies might 
be equated with a supposed non-ideological “defense of individual 
people,” as Sakharov put it (in Moyn 2010, 139), or basic ethical vi-
sions of the “good” society.  Both politically and socially, or within 
institutions, on the part of specific, central global political actors as 
well as in everyday discourse and among advocates of the globally 
disadvantaged, “human rights” became, or at least could become, 
an amorphous conceptual reference point for individual liberation. 
“Human rights” might be the catchword for social protection, jus-
tice and freedom of mind.  Human rights might resonate in the 
space of those denied them.  However, they might also resonate in 
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the spaces of those who have the power to grant them (rights), or at 
least institutionalize their (rights’) existence.
In terms of a human rights life-world, engagement with the his-
toriography of human rights in the mid- and late-twentieth century 
yields two results.  Firstly, while it may resonate that human rights 
– representations of justice, liberation, fairness, human ethics and 
concepts of universal humanity – gain both “literal” and “figura-
tive” representations, or that we find ourselves confronted by both 
“factual” and “fictional” human rights representations, that is but a 
part of the broader picture of the manner in which we come into 
contact with rights ideals, or rights “discourses.”  We won’t here 
venture into discourse theory.  However, NGOs, protest groups (see 
Madison 2011) and the globally marginalized continue to invoke 
human rights discourses.  This is how it has always been.  Human 
rights are “counter-hegemonic” (see, e.g., Ishay 2004, 343), or strikes 
against overweening uses of institutionalized (state) or social ma-
jority power (e.g., legal, ethnic, gender or economic oppression). 
However, human rights are part of the panoply of vocabularies in-
voked by “hegemons” – those sitting in the most powerful of global 
socio-political locales.  This trend began almost immediately with 
the end of the Cold War.  In his famous speech on the “new world 
order” (1991), George H.W.  Bush asked if ours wouldn’t be a world 
where “the United Nations, free from Cold War stalemate” would 
“fulfill the historic mission of its founders.”  Would this not be, 
Bush asked, a world in which “freedom and respect for human 
rights” would “find a home among all nations” (Miller Center 
2012)?  Such vocabularies continued into the 1990s and the early 
twenty-first century.  NGOs, activist groups met with world leaders 
in 1993 at the World Conference on Human Rights to reaffirm glob-
al commitments to human rights in the wake of the Cold War.  Hu-
man rights fit centrally on agendas for meetings between the two 
new global superpowers – China and the U.S. (see, e.g., Liang-Fen-
ton 2004; Meys 2009).  Human rights are debated between “legiti-
mate” states (such as the U.S.) and “rogue” states (such as Iran) in 
terms of who has the better human rights record (e.g., Hunter, 2010) 
(Ahmed Ahmadinejad famously declared in an interview with the 
Internet broadcaster Democracy Now that he thought Iran’s human 
rights record compared favorably with that of the U.S.).  From cam-
paigns such as NATO’s bombing of Kosovo (1999) to the UN sanc-
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tioned of bombing in Libya (2011), significant international institu-
tions are make increased numbers of foreign interventions in the 
name of human rights (see United Nations Security Council 2011). 
Using a socio-historical vocabulary, human rights continue to be 
spoken “below” us – by the socially marginalized and politically 
disadvantaged.  However, perhaps more than ever before, they – 
“human rights” – are spoken by those “above” us as well.  This in-
cludes the globally powerful, and those who sit at the center of sig-
nificant political, economic and social decision making processes.
Conclusion:  A Human Rights Life-World?
What has been presented here is, by some standards, an unusual 
mode of life-world analysis.  Though the life-world, and our “world-
horizons” – our perceptive spaces – are undoubtedly described as 
“literal” and “figurative” in the work of Husserl, the emphasis by 
phenomenologists tends to be on fundamental questions.  How do 
we perceive?  How do we know that others are around us?  What is 
the character of the material world – the “objects” – which surrounds 
us?  Are there connections between the nature of consciousness and 
the perception of others and things that demonstrates a universal na-
ture to subjectivity?  How do social bonds, if they exist at all, become 
formed?  Is there a way to see past the presumptions of the life-world 
so that its basic “structure” becomes revealed (Husserl 1970, 139)?
We have partially deployed such levels of life-world analysis. 
That we have emphasized the “literality” and “figuration,” or at 
least “literality” and “figuration” in human rights representation, is 
true to phenomenological pursuits.  Such emphases accentuate the 
subjectivity of perception – that “we” (social subjects) see wide rang-
es of things in our daily lives.  What we “see” occupies multiple 
modalities – everything from “fact” to fictional “fantasies.”  How-
ever, the analysis has here been specific.  We have concerned our-
selves with relations to a single concept:  human rights.  That has 
moreover been in a vague sense.  I.e., we have worked on the idea 
that we may have specific senses that rights laws and institutions 
exist.  However, for most of us, our relations with rights ideas are 
more intuitive.  Rights represent vague senses of the self, ambitions 
for political liberation and multiplicious notions of individual “free-
dom.”  We get these, or are least communicated these, through fac-
tual and fictional content.
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This paper has also taken a historical approach.  About the histo-
rian, Husserl (1970, 147) wrote that his or her task was to “recon-
struct the changing, surrounding life-worlds of the peoples and pe-
riods with which they deal.”  This is complex.  This is because 
reconstruction involves departing from the life-world in which one 
finds oneself and using one’s own presumptions in order to describe 
them (one’s own presumptions).  This gives way to a kind of Gestalt 
picture of global cultural life – how do we view our times?  History 
becomes a kind of artistic endeavor in self-reflection.
We have accepted the charge that historians work in “broad 
strokes” and the painting of Gestalt pictures is their goal.  This pa-
per has approached the life-world as something real – a “surround-
ing” environment.  However, we have also used “life-world” meta-
phorically – when we think about a concept such as human rights, 
where do we find ourselves?  How do we have such concepts “at 
hand,” and what are the ways in which the presentation of rights 
ideas is so rich – “thick” might be another term – that it seems natu-
ral they’re there?
I proffer the following model:
Fact
Fiction
The horizon of 
the life-world
Socially high;
dominant; central
Socially low;
oppressed; marginal
The social subject
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Intended here is a broad sense of where stand, or “find ourselves,” 
in relation to human rights – how, in our “times,” we gain sense of 
human rights as part of a necessary historical condition in which 
we find ourselves.  À la the notion of life-world, the idea is outlin-
ing a conceptual and tactile space in which human rights appear 
“everywhere.”  Human rights sit to the left and right of us, occupy-
ing the sinews of fact and fiction.  Human rights come into a “halo” 
of reality in which fact and fiction merge, and concepts are tied to 
both modes of representation – historically “true” and not, or at 
least “less” than true (commercialized and fictionalized).  Human 
rights occupy also the vocabularies of the socially most powerful, 
and the least as well.  This is the life-world’s “above and below” – 
discursive locales from which articulation of rights emerge, and 
we orient ourselves towards the social body.  This is a sociological 
point.  However, it’s also a historical point to the extent that it’s 
comprehensible via longer term histories of rights – the constitu-
tion of rights in ancient or early modern history, yes, but also via 
the concrete institution of human rights vocabularies in the 1940s. 
Human rights were once an inclusive discourse, spoken by the 
powerful and the not.  The “inclusiveness” of rights dissipated in 
the mid-twentieth century, however.  Here, capitalism and com-
munism vied to occupy the seat of the “end” of politics, or its final 
“utopia.”  In the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, how-
ever, the situation has changed.  Rights permeate us on all sides – 
the claims of the powerful, the petitions of the not, and the mul-
tiple representational channels and modes through which those 
claims are made and rights ideas disseminated, often intentionally 
and sometimes not.  It’s in this way, claims this paper, that human 
rights become something one can’t “avoid.”  Rights are borne by 
our essential modes of world constitution – fact and fiction – and 
become a social concept difficult to see beyond as there are few 
who don’t speak their vocabulary.  It’s in this way that we might 
argue we live in a “life-world” of rights – an age of rights in which 
rights, human rights, are ineluctably ours and become difficult to 
see past, or “avoid.”
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